Article 23 of the Constitution of India prohibits traffic in human beings, begar (forced labour), and other similar forms of forced labour. Any violation of this mandate is treated as a punishable offence under law. It protects every individual, whether citizen or non-citizen, against coercion, abuse, and practices that reduce human beings to commodities or unpaid labour. It applies against both State authorities as well as private individuals.
Art. 23(1) states,
“Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.”
The expression ‘traffic in human beings’ include: -
- selling and buying of men, women and children like goods;
- immoral traffic in women and children, including prostitution;
- devadasis; and
- slavery.
To punish these acts, the Parliament has made the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.
The term ‘begar’ means compulsory work without remuneration. It was a peculiar Indian system under which the local zamindars sometimes used to force their tenants to render services without any payment.
- Case: Rulweinao Kahaosan Tangkhul v. Rulweinao Simirei Shailei Khullakpa (1960) – In this case, it was held that ancient tribal or customary practices cannot bypass constitutional protections, declaring that forced free labour performed for village chiefs is a direct violation of Article 23(1) of the Constitution.
In addition to begar, the Article 23 prohibits other ‘similar forms of forced labour’ like ‘bonded labour’. ‘Bonded Labour’ refers to the system under which one person can be bonded to provide labour to another for years and years until an alleged debt is supposed to be wiped out; which never seems to happen during the life time of the bonded labourer.
The term ‘forced labour’ means compelling a person to work against his will. The word ‘force’ includes not only physical or legal force but also force arising from the compulsion of economic circumstances, that is, working for less than the minimum wage.
In this regard, the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976; the Minimum Wages Act, 1948; the Contract Labour Act, 1970 and the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 were made.
Clause (2) of this Art. provides for an exception to Clause (1). It states,
“Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public purposes, and in imposing such service the State shall not make any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them.”
For instance, military service or social service, for which it is not bound to pay.
Important Case Laws
- Chandra v. State of Rajasthan (1956) – In this case, the court held that a village Sarpanch has no legal authority to force villagers to perform compulsory, unpaid labour, declaring the practice a direct violation of the prohibition against begar under Article 23(1). The court ruled that when an authority uses the threat of financial penalties or social coercion to force a citizen to work against their will without pay, it is the exact definition of begar. It also ruled that a village Sarpanch or local Panchayat is not empowered to independently invoke Article 23(2).
- Dulal Samanta v. District Magistrate, Howrah (1958) – In this case, the Calcutta High Court clarified the scope of the State’s power to impose compulsory public service under Article 23(2), ruling that appointing citizens as special police officers does not amount to unconstitutional forced labour. The High Court ruled that while Article 23(1) completely bans begar and involuntary exploitation, it must be read alongside Article 23(2). This clause explicitly allows the State to impose “compulsory service for public purposes.” The Court held that maintaining public order, preventing communal riots, and protecting neighbourhoods during an emergency are the highest forms of public purpose, making the forced appointment of Special Police Officers constitutionally valid.
- PUDR v. Union of India (1982) – This case is also known as ‘Asiad Construction Workers Case’. In this case, the court ruled that force is not limited to physical violence or legal compulsion; it can also be born from crushing economic necessity. When a person is trapped in poverty and has no choice but to accept work at less than the minimum wage just to survive, that labour is inherently forced. Consequently, paying less than the legal minimum wage is a direct violation of Article 23. The Court clarified that the protections of Articles 17, 23, and 24 are not just shields against the State, but are fully enforceable against private individuals and corporations. The Court held that it is the constitutional duty of the State to actively intervene, prosecute, and stop private masters, contractors, or employers from exploiting vulnerable citizens.
- Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan (1983) – In this case, it was held that the State cannot pay less than the statutory minimum wage to workers engaged in famine relief or drought distress operations, declaring any such underpayment a direct violation of Article 23. Building directly upon the principle set in PUDR v. Union of India (1982), the Court held that when the State provides employment to citizens driven to desperation by famine, the workers have no real choice or bargaining power. Forcing them to work for a pittance because they are starving is an exercise of economic coercion. Therefore, paying less than the minimum wage, even during a famine relief operation; amounts to forced labour under Article 23. The Bench ruled that the State cannot invoke a natural disaster or financial scarcity as a legal excuse to violate the fundamental rights of its citizens.
- Deena v. Union of India (1983) – In this case, it was held that forcing prison inmates to perform hard physical labour without paying them reasonable, market-aligned wages is a direct form of forced labour and violates Article 23. The Bench established that incarceration strips a person of their physical liberty, but it does not give the State a right to financially exploit their work.
- Devendra Nath Gupta v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1983) – In this case, the court upheld the State’s authority to assign non-teaching duties like election administration and educational surveys to government school teachers, ruling that such deployments do not violate the prohibition on forced labour (begar) under Article 23(1). The High Court ruled that while Article 23(1) completely outlaws private exploitation and forced commercial labour, it is strictly bound by Article 23(2). This exception clause explicitly allows the State to demand compulsory service for a “public purpose.” The Court held that conducting census operations, managing democratic elections, compiling voter registers, and gathering foundational educational metrics are critical national objectives essential for the survival and governance of a democratic society.
- Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) – A letter detailing a survey of stone quarries in the Faridabad District, which revealed that a large number of labourers were working under “inhuman and intolerable conditions”, was treated as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL). The Court subsequently laid down comprehensive guidelines for identifying bonded labourers and placed a mandatory constitutional duty on the State government to locate, release, and rehabilitate them. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that whenever a labourer is found performing forced labour for less than the statutory minimum wage, the law will automatically presume they are doing so in consideration of an economic advance or debt, classifying them as bonded labourers under the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. The burden of proof was shifted entirely onto the employer to prove otherwise.
- Vishal Jeet v. Union of India (1990) – In this case, the court laid down comprehensive structural directives to eradicate child prostitution, rescue minors from commercial sexual exploitation, and abolish deep-rooted customary forms of human trafficking. The Court ruled that human trafficking and forced prostitution are direct violations of Article 23 (Right against Exploitation) and strip a human being of their fundamental right to live with basic human dignity under Article 21. The Court emphasized that under Articles 39(e) and 39(f) of the Directive Principles, the State bears a non-delegable constitutional duty to safeguard children and vulnerable young girls from moral, physical, and economic abandonment.
