Article 19 - Protection of Certain Rights regarding Freedom of Speech, etc. | Constitution of India

Article 19 of the Indian Constitution guarantees several important freedoms to citizens. It provides six fundamental rights: the freedom of speech and expression, the right to assemble peacefully, the freedom to form associations or unions, the right to move freely across India, the freedom to reside and settle in any part of the country, and the right to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade, or business. These freedoms are vital for the functioning of a democracy and the overall development of individuals. However, these rights are not unlimited. The State may impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of the security of the State, public order, morality, and the sovereignty and integrity of India. Art. 19 is available only to citizens, and it can be exercised only against the State.

While Art. 19(1) states the right of the citizens; Art. 19(2) – (6) provides for the provisions of reasonable restrictions that the State can enforce, so that, an individual doesn’t take undue advantage of the rights provided in 19(1).

Our Constitution recognizes that liberty has to be limited in order to be effectively exercised. Dr. Ambedkar in his speech in the Constituent Assembly emphasized the need for the restrictions when he said,

“Instead of formulating fundamental rights in absolute terms and depending upon our Supreme Court to come to the rescue of Parliament by inventing the doctrine of police power, it (the Constitution) permits the State directly to impose limitations upon the fundamental rights.”

Case: A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 27) – In this case, the court observed that man as a rational being desires to do many things, but in a civil society his desires have to be controlled, regulated and reconciled with the exercise of similar desires by other individuals.

A restriction to be constitutionally valid, must satisfy the following two tests –

1. the restriction must be for the purposes mentioned in clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19;
2. the restriction must be reasonable.

The term “reasonable restriction” connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in the enjoyment of his right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is actually required in the interest of public.

Article 19(1)

Article 19(1) guarantees to the citizens of India the following six fundamental freedoms:

a) Freedom of Speech and Expression

b) Freedom of Assembly

c) Freedom to form Associations

d) Freedom of Movement

e) Freedom to Reside and to Settle

g) Freedom of profession, occupation, trade or business.

[Note: Clause (f) - Right to acquire, hold and dispose of property- was abolished by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978 with effect from 19-6-1979. In the result the citizen has no fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. By the same amendment, Art. 300A has been inserted which safeguards that a person can be deprived of his property only by a law made by the legislature and not by an executive fiat.]

Art. 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression.

It states that all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. the right to express one’s convictions, and opinions freely by word of mouth, writing, printing, pictures, electronic media or any other mode (addressed to the eyes or the ears). It also includes the right to propagate or publish the views of other people, otherwise this freedom would not include the freedom of press.

Freedom of expression has three broad special purposes to serve –

1. it helps an individual to attain self-fulfilment;
2. it assists in the discovery of truth;
3. it strengthens the capacity of an individual in participating in decision-making

Art. 19(2) empowers the State to put reasonable restrictions on the following grounds:

• security of the State
• friendly relations with foreign States
• public order
• decency and morality
• contempt of court
• defamation
• incitement to an offence
• integrity and sovereignty of India

Important Case Laws:

1. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986) – This case is also known as ‘National Anthem Case’; in which it was stated that Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression includes Freedom of Silence (Right to remain silent) as well.

The case arose when three siblings, Bijoe, Binu, and Bindu Emmanuel, who were Jehovah’s Witnesses, were expelled from their school in Kerala for refusing to sing the national anthem, “Jana Gana Mana,” during the morning assembly. While they stood up respectfully whenever the anthem was sung, their religious convictions prevented them from singing it, as their faith permits them to sing praises only to God. After a local Member of the Legislative Assembly raised the issue, the Director of Public Instruction ordered the school to expel the children unless they agreed to sing. The children challenged this expulsion in the Kerala High Court, which rejected their plea, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court of India.

The Supreme Court ruled that the expulsion violated the children’s fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) (Freedom of Speech and Expression) and Article 25(1) (Freedom of Conscience and Religion) of the Indian Constitution. The court held that no provision of law obliges anyone to sing the national anthem.

2. Brij Bhushan and Anr. v. State of Delhi (1950) – In this case, the Supreme Court established that Freedom of the Press is an essential part of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression.

The Supreme Court struck down the executive order, ruling that pre-censorship of a journal constitutes a direct infringement on the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). The Court held that the state could only restrict this right under the highly narrow grounds explicitly outlined in Article 19(2) at the time, which saved laws relating to matters that “undermine the security of or tend to overthrow the State”. The Court clarified that keeping “public safety” or “public order” did not automatically equate to protecting the security of the state itself. Alongside the parallel case of Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, this judgment directly prompted the Indian Parliament to pass the First Constitutional Amendment Act in 1951, which officially added “public order” as a valid ground for permissible restrictions under Article 19(2).

3. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950) – This case also highlighted the fact that freedom of the press is an integral part of the freedom of speech and expression, while drawing a strict boundary against broad government censorship.  
4. Sakal Papers v. Union of India (1962) – In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the state cannot use economic or business regulations to indirectly restrict freedom of the press.

The dispute arose over the Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956 and the Daily Newspapers (Price and Page) Order, 1960. These regulations empowered the central government to dictate how many pages a newspaper could publish based on the price it charged readers, while also capping the space available for commercial advertisements.

The Supreme Court struck down the Act and the Order as unconstitutional, declaring that the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to circulate and determine the volume of a newspaper. The Court clarified that the state cannot restrict freedom of the press under the guise of regulating commercial trade under Article 19(1)(g). The Court emphasized that any restriction on free speech must strictly and explicitly fit within the narrow, exhaustive grounds listed in Article 19(2), such as the sovereignty of India or public order. Because a newspaper’s price, page count, and advertisement allocation directly influence its circulation, the government’s economic intervention was deemed an illicit prior restraint that reduced the volume of news available to the public.

5. Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India (1972) – This case firmly established that the government cannot use newsprint quotas or commercial regulations to indirectly control the size, circulation, or voice of independent newspapers.

The conflict arose when the government introduced the Newsprint Control Order, 1962 and the Newsprint Import Control Policy for 1972–73.

The Supreme Court struck down the restrictive provisions of the newsprint policy, ruling that the right to freedom of speech and expression includes the freedom of the press to decide its own page count, circulation volume, and advertisement space. The Court applied the ground-breaking “effect and operation” test, which looks at the actual impact of a law on a citizen rather than the government’s stated motive. The Court held that while the government can regulate the fair distribution of scarce raw materials like newsprint under Article 19(1)(g) (freedom of trade), it cannot use raw material distribution as a tool to control editorial freedom or penalize a newspaper’s success. The judgment confirmed that the state cannot force a publication to reduce its news or advertisement pages, as this directly reduces its revenue and ability to disseminate information, violating Article 19(1)(a).

6. R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) – This case is widely known as the ‘Auto Shankar Case’. In this case, it was held that the government cannot impose prior restraint or censorship on the press based on feared defamation.
7. Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India (1960) – It is a landmark Supreme Court case that first established that commercial speech, such as advertisements, does not enjoy the same absolute level of protection under Article 19(1)(a) as political or artistic expression.

The Supreme Court ruled that advertisements for purely commercial commodities do not represent an exercise of free speech or expression. A five-judge Constitution Bench held that while advertising is a form of communication, a commercial advertisement lacks the element of “expression of ideas” and is instead driven solely by trade and profit. Therefore, the restrictions imposed to curb false claims and public health hazards fell within reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) to protect public interest.

8. Tata Press v. MTNL (1995) – In this case, it was held that commercial speech (such as advertising) is protected under Article 19(1)(a).

The Supreme Court declared that the free flow of commercial information is indispensable to a democratic economy. Overruling the rigid approach of the earlier Hamdard Dawakhana precedent, the Court held that advertising benefits society by keeping consumers informed, allowing them to make intelligent economic choices, and maintaining the financial independence of the press. The Court clarified that while the government can regulate false or misleading advertisements under Article 19(2), it cannot suppress legitimate commercial speech to protect a state monopoly.

9. Union of India v. Naveen Jindal (2004) – In this case, it was held that flying the national flag with respect and dignity is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. It is a form of expression.

The Supreme Court held that the right to fly the National Flag represents an expression of an individual’s allegiance, sentiment, and pride for their nation, making it an integral part of the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression. However, the Bench clarified that this fundamental right is not absolute and remains subject to the following legal boundaries:

• The Court ruled that the Flag Code of India consists of executive instructions and does not constitute a “law” under Article 13(3)(a). Consequently, its guidelines cannot be used to impose restrictions on a fundamental right unless backed by statutory law.
• The right to fly the flag can be regulated under Article 19(2) by valid parliamentary enactments, specifically the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 and the Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act, 1950.
• Citizens must maintain proper etiquette, ensuring the flag is displayed with the utmost dignity and respect as laid out in the revised Flag Code of India, 2002 (which was introduced during the pendency of this case to liberalise public flag display).

10. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) – In this case, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, establishing that online speech enjoys the same constitutional protections as offline speech.

The Supreme Court struck down Section 66A in its entirety, ruling that the state cannot criminalise online speech simply because it is deemed offensive, annoying, or inconvenient. The Court drew a sharp line between “discussion”, “advocacy”, and “incitement”. It held that a citizen’s speech can only be restricted under Article 19(2) if it reaches the clear threshold of clear incitement to violence or a direct threat to public order; mere advocacy or discussion of an unpopular cause cannot be restricted.

Art. 19(1)(b) - Freedom to Assemble Peacefully and Without Arms.

It states that every citizen has the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. Thus, there is a right to hold public meetings and demonstrations and take out processions peacefully. It enables citizens to collectively express their opinions and participate in democratic activities.

Meetings are the most common form of coming together. In fact, the purpose of holding an assembly is to educate the public and the formation of opinion on religious, political, economic or social problems. That is why the ‘right of assembly’ guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(b) is a corollary of the ‘right to freedom of speech and expression’ guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a).

This Right to Freedom of Assembly is regulated by Art. 19(3). To maintain public peace and protect national interest, the State may impose reasonable restrictions on the grounds of: -

1. Sovereignty and Integrity of India
2. Public Order

Thus, an assembly declared unlawful can be validly banned. Section 141 of IPC [Section 189 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)] defines an ‘Unlawful Assembly’ as a group of five or more people who share a common illegal goal:

1. Intimidate the Government: Use criminal force (or the threat of it) to scare the Central or State Government, Parliament, State Legislatures, or any public worker doing their duty.
2. Resist the Law: Fight against the carrying out of any law or any legal court process.
3. Commit Crimes: Do any bad act, criminal damage (mischief), illegal entry (criminal trespass), or another crime.
4. Force Property Rights: Use physical force to take property, block a road (right of way), or stop someone from using water or other rightful things.
5. Force People to Act: Use force to make a person do something they do not have to do, or stop them from doing what they are legally allowed to do.

An assembly that starts peacefully can also become unlawful later.

This article does not afford protection to a violent or riotous assembly or for one which bears arms. Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now substituted by S.163 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,2023) has been held to be valid because it authorizes the making of temporary orders for the prohibition of meetings or processions to prevent an imminent breach of peace.

Art. 19(1)(c) – Freedom of Association.

This article guarantees to all citizens the right to form associations, unions, co-operative societies for lawful purposes. An “association” means a collection of persons who have joined together for a certain object, which may be for the benefit of the members or the welfare or advantage of the public. It Includes the formation of political parties, trade unions, professional bodies, NGOs, clubs, and cooperative societies. The part with Co-operative Societies was added by the 97^th Constitution Amendment together with Part IX-B of the Constitution that talks about co-operative societies.

The Right to Form Association also includes the Right to Not Be Part of an Association.

Under Art. 19(4), the State may impose reasonable restrictions on the ground of: -

1. Sovereignty and Integrity of India
2. Public Order
3. Morality

Important Case Laws:

1. All India Bank Employees Association v. National Industrial Tribunal (1962) – In this case, it was held that Right to Strike or Right to Lock-Out does NOT come under the purview of Art. 19(1)(c).

The Supreme Court established that the right to form an association does not include a fundamental right to achieve the association’s specific business objectives. The court clarified that Article 19(1)(c) strictly protects the act of coming together, organizing, and maintaining an association without arbitrary state interference. It does not extend to a constitutional guarantee that the union must succeed in collective bargaining, nor does it establish a fundamental right to strike. The Court emphasized that labour rights like industrial dispute resolutions, strikes, and lockouts are statutory rights governed entirely by specific labour legislations and can be regulated or restricted by Parliament under Article 19(4) for public order or morality.

2. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) – In this case, it was held that the Right to Form Association included to the Right to Form Political Parties.

The Supreme Court recognized that the freedom of association under Article 19(1)(c) encompasses the right of citizens to form, join, and operate political parties. The Court clarified that while groups have the constitutional freedom to associate, a state government run by a political party that actively promotes unsecular or religiously divisive agendas can be legally dismissed under Article 356. Essentially, Article 19(1)(c) does not shield a political association if its actions break down the secular fabric of the Constitution.

3. People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (AIR 2004 SC 456) – In this case, it was held that declaring an organization as a terrorist organization under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, would be permissible.

Art. 19(1)(d) & (e) – Freedom of Movement and Association.

Art. 19(1)(d) guarantees every citizen the right to move freely throughout the territory of India without any restriction, and Art. 19(1)(e) guarantees every citizen the freedom to reside and permanently settle in any part of the country. Both the rights lay stress on the oneness of the territory of India. Any citizen can travel to or reside in any part of India. This is in consonance with the ‘single citizenship’ provided by Art. 5 of the Constitution.

The ‘Freedom of Movement’ has three aspects –

1. The right to move inside the country;
2. The right to move out of the country;
3. The right to come back to the country.

Art. 19(5) provides for the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of these rights. The State may impose reasonable restrictions on the following grounds: -

1. In the interest of general public;
2. For the protection of the interest of any Scheduled Tribe.

Important Case Laws:

1. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. (1963) – In this case, it was held that it was held that the right to move freely throughout the territory of India mean the ‘right of locomotion’ which connotes the right to move wherever one likes, whenever one likes, and however one likes.

In a visionary dissenting opinion, Justice K. Subba Rao argued that the Right to Privacy is an essential and integral part of personal liberty under Article 21. He asserted that physical liberty is meaningless if a citizen’s every movement is constantly tracked by the state, noting that Article 19(1)(d) (freedom of movement) and Article 21 must be read together to protect a citizen from psychological and physical restraint.

(Note: While the majority in 1962 refused to explicitly recognize privacy, Justice Subba Rao’s famous dissent eventually became the law of the land when a nine-judge bench in the Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (2017) case officially overruled the Kharak Singh majority, declaring privacy a fundamental right under Article 21.)

2. Malak Singh and Others v. State of Punjab & Haryana (1981) – In this case, it was held that a watch by the police on the movement of a suspect does not infringe the right.

The Court ruled that while discreet surveillance is an essential tool to fight organized crime, it cannot be used as a license to harass citizens. Surveillance must not be so intrusive that it “squeezes” fundamental freedoms, obstructs their enjoyment, or offends individual human dignity.

Art. 19(1)(g) – Freedom of Profession, Occupation, Trade or Business.

It states that every individual has the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. It ensures economic freedom and right to livelihood.

The right to carry on a business includes the right not to enter a business and the right to close the business. The first negative right is absolute but second may be subjected to restrictions in the interest of public e.g. requirement to pay compensation to workers. The Industrial Disputes Act requires the employer to obtain permission of the State government before closure; it is not unreasonable.

Under Art. 19(6), the State has also been empowered to prescribe professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, as well as for enabling the State to carry on any trade or business to the exclusion of citizens wholly or partially. In fact, the State is competent to nationalize any trade or to monopolize a trade.

Important Case Laws:

1. Narendra Kumar and Others v. Union of India (1960) – In this case, it was held that restrictions may also amount to ‘prohibition’ under certain circumstances.

The Bench ruled that in exceptional circumstances and to protect the general public interest, a restriction can extend to total prohibition if lesser actions cannot solve the underlying social or economic evil. To ensure the state does not misuse this power, the Court formulated a balancing test. It held that judges must look at the overall context, the nature of the evil being remedied, the ratio of harm caused to individual citizens versus the benefit expected for the general public, and whether the restriction is more aggressive than what is strictly necessary.

2. Excel Wear v. Union of India (1979) – In this case, the court ruled that the fundamental right to start and carry on a business under Article 19(1)(g) includes the right to close down that business.

The Constitution Bench ruled that just as a citizen cannot be forced to speak or marry, an employer cannot be legally compelled by the state to operate a business at a loss or face dangerous conditions. The negative aspect, the right not to carry on business, is an intrinsic component of Article 19(1)(g). The Court clarified that while Indian socialism aims to establish a welfare state, it operates under a mixed economy framework. It cannot be used to completely ignore the basic proprietary liberties of private owners or trap them in bankruptcy.

3. Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) – This case formally established the Right to Education as a fundamental right under Article 21. The litigation consolidated petitions from private medical and engineering colleges across multiple states, including Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu. These private entities challenged state laws that capped tuition rates and prohibited the collection of arbitrary, commercialized “capitation fees” from students. The colleges argued that such financial regulations violated their economic right to carry on an occupation under Article 19(1)(g).

The Court ruled that the Right to Education is fundamentally implicit in the Right to Life and Personal Liberty under Article 21. By reading Article 21 alongside the Directive Principles of State Policy (Article 45), the Court held that every child under 14 has an enforceable right to free, compulsory basic education. The Court clarified that running an educational institution is an “occupation” under Article 19(1)(g), but it is a noble, charitable enterprise. Because education is a social mission, commercial profiteering and under-the-table “capitation fees” are completely illegal. The state has every right to impose strict reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) to keep education fair.

4. P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) – In this case, the Court ruled that the state cannot force private, unaided educational institutions (both minority and non-minority) to implement caste-based reservations or surrender a percentage of seats to a government quota. Forcing an unaided institution to give up seats to the state violates their fundamental right to establish and administer an educational choice under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 30(1). To prevent exploitation and protect students, the Court held that admissions to professional courses must be transparent, fair, and merit-based. The Court reiterated that private education is a charitable “occupation” under Article 19(1)(g), meaning capitation fees and commercial profiteering are strictly prohibited. Institutions can set their own fee structures to recover expenses and generate a reasonable surplus for expansion, but these must be vetted by a state-appointed Fee Regulatory Committee to ensure transparency.
5. B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. (1999) – In this case, the court held that lotteries are a form of gambling and are considered res extra commercium (outside commerce), meaning they do not enjoy fundamental trade protections.

The Court held that even if a lottery is legally organized or sponsored by a state government, its underlying character remains pure gambling. Drawing analogies to the trade of liquor or toxic substances, the Court clarified that vicious and pernicious activities do not qualify as “trade, commerce, or intercourse” under Article 301 or Article 19(1)(g). Because citizens have no fundamental right to gamble, the state has the absolute authority to regulate, monopolize, or ban it entirely to protect public welfare. A state can only ban lotteries from other states if it simultaneously bans its own state-run lotteries.

6. State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi (2005) – In this case, it was held that reasonable restrictions on trade, such as prohibiting cow slaughter for public welfare, are valid.

In the 1958 Hanif Quareshi case, the Court had ruled that a total ban on the slaughter of bulls and bullocks past their useful reproductive or agricultural age (set at 16 years) was an unreasonable restriction on butchers. In 2005, the seven-judge bench departed from this ruling, noting that changes in the socio-economic landscape and a deeper scientific understanding of agriculture meant that cattle remains highly valuable for biogas, dung, and organic farming even when old or infirm. The Court took a massive leap in constitutional interpretation by holding that Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs) can justify restrictions on fundamental rights. The Bench ruled that the state’s duty to protect cattle under Article 48, safeguard the environment under Article 48A, and honour the fundamental duty of citizens to have compassion for living creatures under Article 51A(g) constitutes a valid “compelling public interest” under Article 19(6). The Court rejected the argument that the law destroyed the butchers’ livelihood. It clarified that the amendment only banned the slaughter of cow progeny, leaving the community entirely free to trade in and slaughter other livestock, such as goats, sheep, or buffaloes. Therefore, the restriction was deemed reasonable and proportionate to the economic and ecological goals of the nation.

Suspension of Article 19 during National Emergency

Under Article 358 of the Indian Constitution, the six fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Article 19 are automatically suspended when a National Emergency is declared due to war or external aggression, requiring no separate executive order. However, the 44th Amendment Act of 1978 restricted this so Article 19 cannot be suspended during an emergency declared on the ground of armed rebellion.

• Takes effect immediately upon declaring an external emergency; no separate presidential notification is needed.
• Applies only for war or external aggression, excluded for armed rebellion.
• Empowers the state to make laws or take executive actions that abridge these six freedoms without legal challenge.
• Rights spring back to life automatically the moment the emergency proclamation ends.