Art. 15 of the Constitution of India prohibits discrimination on the grounds of caste, race, religion, sex, or place of birth; it guarantees all citizens equal access to public places parks, hotels, restaurants, etc. This right is available to citizens only.

Clauses of Article 15

Art. 15 has six clauses, which are as follows: -

  1. 15(1) – “The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.”

The word ‘discrimination’ means to make an adverse distinction or to distinguish unfavourable from others. If a law makes discrimination on any of the above grounds it can be declared invalid.

Case: D.P. Joshi v. Madhya Bharat (1955) – In this case, capitation fee was imposed on outside students in Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College, Indore. It was held to be violative of Articles 14 (right to equality) and 15(1) (prohibition of discrimination). The court clarified that ‘place of birth’ and ‘residence’ are different, hence granting concession on the basis of residence is valid.

Case: Nainsukhdas v. State of U.P. (1953) – A law which provided for elections on the basis of separate electorates for members of different religious communities was held to be unconstitutional.

  1. 15(2) – “No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to—
  1. access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or
  2. the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.

A ‘place of public resort’ means any building, place, or-enclosure which the public is allowed to enter or has a right to access, including theatres, places of worship, hotels, and sports grounds.

Clause 2 of this Article prohibits both the State and private individuals from making any discrimination, unlike 15(1) which prohibits only the State.

  1. 15(3) – Special Provisions for Women and Children.

It talks about positive discrimination; it is important to bring special provisions for the upliftment and protection of specific groups. Owing to the very nature and maternal functions of women, it becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigour of the race. For that matter, be it provision for maternity relief or reservation for women in select places, etc., it will not be violative of Art. 15(1).

Keeping in mind the position of women and children in the society, govt. takes necessary steps and form special laws/provisions for their welfare. For e.g.: Child Labour (Prohibition & Regulation) Act, 1986.

Case: Yusuf v. State of Bombay (1954) - In this case, Mr Yusuf Abdul Aziz, charged with adultery, contended before the Bombay High Court that Section 497 IPC is unconstitutional as it, in contravention of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution, operates unequally between a man and a woman by making only the former responsible for adultery. The court upheld the immunity of women under Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code as per the provision of Art. 15(3).

[Note: - In the landmark 2018 case Joseph Shine v. Union of India, the Supreme Court struck down Section 497 entirely. Adultery is no longer a crime in India.]

  1. 15(4) – Special Provisions for Advancement of Backward Classes.

This clause was inserted by the Constitution (Ist Amendment) Act, 1951, due to decision in State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951).

Case: State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) – In this case, The State of Madras enforced a long-standing executive order (Communal Government Order) that fixed strict seat quotas for medical and engineering college admissions based on distinct religious and caste groups. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan was denied admission to a medical college despite having eligible marks, because her caste quota limit had been filled. She filed a writ petition at the Madras High Court stating it violated her rights. The Madras High Court ruled in favour of Dorairajan, declaring the Communal G.O. illegal and unconstitutional, prompting the State of Madras to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court verdict, ruling that allocating college seats based rigidly on caste and religion violated Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) of the Constitution. The Court established that Directive Principles of State Policy (like Article 46 promoting educational interests of weaker sections) must remain subservient to, and cannot override, enforceable Fundamental Rights. The bench noted that while Article 16(4) explicitly allowed reservations in public employment, no similar clause permitted caste-based reservations in state educational institutions at that time. First Constitutional Amendment Act, 1951. The amendment introduced Article 15(4), empowering the state to make special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes or Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes regarding educational admissions.

The provisions made in clause (4) of Article 15 is only an enabling provision and does not impose any obligation on the State to take any special action under it. It merely confers a discretion to act if necessary by way of making special provision for backward classes. A writ cannot be issued to the State to make reservation.

‘Backward Classes’ is not defined in the Constitution. Article 340, however, empowers the President to appoint a Commission to investigate conditions of socially and educationally backward classes. On the basis of the report of the Commission, the President may specify as to who are to be considered as Backward Classes.

Case: M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1962) – With Art. 15(4) coming into effect, the State of Mysore issued an executive order reserving 68% of seats in state medical and engineering colleges. The allocation split seats among Scheduled Castes (15%), Scheduled Tribes (3%), Backward Classes (28%), and More Backward Classes (22%). Eligible students who were denied admissions despite high merit scores challenged the order under Article 32, arguing it acted as a “fraud on the Constitution”. A five-judge Constitution Bench struck down the Mysore state order based on three critical principles:

  1. The Court ruled that Article 15(4) is a “special provision” designed to advance weaker classes, but it cannot swallow the general rule of equality. Therefore, reservations must remain reasonable and generally below 50%
  2. To classify an “Other Backward Class” (OBC), the state must look at both social and educational backwardness; caste cannot be the sole or dominant test. Poverty, occupations, and geography must be factored in.
  3. The court rejected the state's division of OBCs into “Backward” and “More Backward” categories, stating that Article 15(4) does not envision such internal stratification.

This ruling acted as the primary constitutional check on excessive reservations for nearly three decades until it was partially modified by the historic nine-judge bench in the Indra Sawhney v. Union of India case.

Case: Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) – This case, also known as Mandal Commission case, arose after the government issued executive orders implementing a 27% job quota for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) based on the Mandal Commission's recommendations, alongside an additional 10% economic quota for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) of forward castes. Legal practitioner Indra Sawhney challenged these quotas, arguing they violated constitutional guarantees of equality and compromised administrative efficiency. In a historic 6:3 majority ruling, the Supreme Court upheld the 27% OBC reservation, affirming that a caste could be recognized as a “backward class” if it suffered from pervasive social and educational backwardness. However, the Court enforced strict constitutional guardrails:

  • it struck down the 10% economic quota for upper castes,
  • introduced the “creamy layer” doctrine to exclude wealthy backward class individuals from benefits,
  • barred reservations in departmental promotions,
  • and capped total annual reservations at a strict 50% ceiling limit.

This case gave the concept of horizontal and vertical reservation. This foundational ruling balanced affirmative action with merit, prompting successive constitutional amendments over the next three decades to bypass its restrictions on promotions and economic quotas.

  1. 15(5) – This clause was inserted by 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 2005. It provides reservations for SCs, STs, and OBCs in educational institutions, including private (non-minority) institutions. I states that nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30.

Case: TMA. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) - The case arose from a web of challenges against state regulations that dictated fee structures, admission processes, and quota configurations in private minority and non-minority colleges, particularly regarding professional courses like engineering and medicine. The Supreme Court declared that the right to establish and administer educational institutions is a fundamental freedom under Article 19(1)(g) for all citizens, and under Article 30(1) specifically for religious and linguistic minorities. The Court observed that the State cannot put restrictions on the private unaided institution that contravene necessary elements of administration like intake of students, appointment of teachers. The private unaided institutions have a greater autonomy which is an important feature granted to them under Article 19(1) (g) and therefore they should be free to decide the fees and admission as per them, prescribe necessary qualifications for admission. With regards to the fees, the Hon’ble Court stated that the fee structure should not lead to profiteering but should be fixed in a manner that it contributes to advancement of educational institutions and facilities for the students. The Hon’ble Court further mentioned that the Right to Administration do not mean a Right to Maladministration; the state can still enforce reasonable regulations to maintain academic excellence, prevent commercialization of education, and ensure that admissions remain fair and transparent.

Case: P.A. Inamdar’s Case (2005) - The case arose after several state governments passed laws mandating caste-based seat quotas and state-managed admission allocations in completely self-financed, private professional colleges. Private minority and non-minority institutions challenged these moves, arguing that state-enforced seat allocation violated their right to carry on an occupation under Article 19(1)(g) and infringed upon minority rights protected under Article 30(1). The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favour of the institutions, declaring that the state cannot enforce reservation quotas in private unaided colleges. The bench clarified that because these entities receive no government funding, they have the absolute fundamental right to manage their own admissions and devise rational fee structures. While the state retains the power to regulate academic standards, prescribe minimal eligibility criteria, and enforce mechanisms to prevent the commercialization or profiteering of education, it cannot “nationalize” seats via reservation. This judgment prompted swift political blowback, leading Parliament to enact the 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act which added Article 15(5) to specifically bypass this ruling and allow reservations in private unaided institutions, while continuing to exempt minority institutions.

P.A. Inamdar (2005) was an extension and clarification of T.M.A. Pai (2002).

Case: Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) – In this case, the Supreme Court of India upheld the validity of the 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act (2005) and the Central Educational Institutions Act, 2006. The controversy erupted after the government introduced a 27% reservation quota for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in premier higher education institutions like IITs, IIMs, and central universities. Public interest litigant Ashoka Kumar Thakur challenged the move, arguing that extending caste-based quotas to higher education violated the Right to Equality and degraded institutional merit. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge and upheld the 27% OBC educational quota, ruling that affirmative action serves as a vital constitutional mechanism to achieve substantive social justice. Crucially, the Court reinforced the “Creamy Layer” exclusion principle first set out in the Indra Sawhney judgment. It ruled that wealthier, socially advanced members of OBC families must be filtered out of the quota system to ensure benefits reach truly disadvantaged citizens. Furthermore, the Court clarified that while the 93rd Amendment inserted Article 15(5) to expand reservation powers, minority-run educational institutions remain strictly exempt from these state-mandated quotas. The court opined that minority educational institutions, by themselves, are a separate class and their rights are protected by other provisions of the Constitution.

  1. 15(6) – Reservation to Economically Weaker Sections (EWS).

This clause was added through 103rd Constitutional Amendment Act of 2019. This amendment introduced a 10% reservation for economically weaker sections (EWS) in government jobs and educational institutions. Modifying Art. 15 and 16, it allows for special provisions benefiting EWS groups while excluding SC, ST, and OBC categories from this reservation. It has been introduced for the betterment of the poor people not falling in the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Socially and Educationally Backward Classes. It is based on the economic situation of the citizens. To qualify for the EWS reservation, the person must meet the following conditions:

  1. Annual income of the family should be less than Rs.8 lakhs.
  2. The family should not own –
  • more than 5 acres of agricultural land;
  • a residential flat of more than 1,000 square feet;
  • a house of more than 100 square yards in a notified municipal area; or
  • a house of more than 200 square yards out of a notified municipal area.

[Note: - Since the Centre and State both are enabled to provide the EWS Reservation, the discretion to apply all or one of the above mentioned criteria to decide EWS is also there with the State Government.]

Case: Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2022) – In this case, the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutional validity of the 103rd Constitutional Amendment Act (2019), legalising a 10% reservation quota for the Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) in public employment and educational institutions. Multiple public interest litigants challenged the amendment, arguing that introducing a quota based solely on economic criteria breached the fundamental principles of the Constitution and violated the strict 50% reservation ceiling limit established in the Indra Sawhney case. In a narrow 3:2 majority verdict, a five-judge Constitution Bench ruled that the EWS quota does not violate the Basic Structure of the Constitution, establishing that poverty or economic backwardness alone is a valid baseline for affirmative action. The majority held that the 50% ceiling rule is flexible rather than absolute, applying primarily to social quotas, and found it reasonable to exclude existing SC, ST, and OBC beneficiaries from EWS criteria since they are already covered by targeted reservation categories. Conversely, the dissenting judges argued that completely barring historically marginalised castes from economic relief represents an unconstitutional form of discrimination.